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INTRODUCTION
In 2017, election officials decided the race for the Ninety-Fourth District of the
Virginia House of Delegates by pulling a name in a film canister out of a ceramic
bowl.1 Officials resorted to this decidedly old school method of calling a race—
which had the potential to give Democrats control of the House of Delegates for the
first time in nearly twenty years—because the race was tied, and at that time, it was
what the law provided as the solution.2 At the tiebreaking, the history of the ceramic
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2021; BA, University of Pennsylvania,
2015. I would like to thank the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal staff for their hard
work and thoughtful edits during a pandemic; Professor Rebecca Green for teaching me the
details of election law; my parents, Sheldon and Ruth, for their support; and Will, for keeping
me sane. This Note was inspired by my experience receiving an absentee ballot for the wrong
party in 2019.
1 Laura Vozzella, A Rare, Random Drawing Helped Republicans Win a Tied Virginia




2 Id. Although the House of Delegates would have been tied 50–50 if the Democrat had
won, with a Democrat in the lieutenant governor’s seat, Democrats would have been able to
break ties in their favor. Id. This tie-breaker was mandated by a law from 1705. Election Tie-
breaker for Virginia House Seat, C-SPAN, at 00:28 (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.c-span.org
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bowl received a longer explanation than why the winner was being chosen from the
bowl3—so how did a race in which 23,896 people voted4 get decided this way?
On Election Day, it appeared that the incumbent, Republican David Yancey, won
by ten votes.5 As officials counted all the ballots in the race, Yancey’s challenger,
Democrat Shelley Simonds, and the Democratic Party of Virginia filed an emergency
motion to see the rejected absentee ballot envelopes and obtain the names of those
voters.6 After getting the names, but not the envelopes, a circuit court judge granted
an order to release an amended request for one particular envelope.7 The voter who
cast that disputed absentee ballot (for Simonds) was an eighty-six-year-old with
macular degeneration (an eye condition) that may have caused her to sign the wrong
part of the envelope—an error that invalidated her vote.8 However, at that point it
appeared that Simonds won the race by one vote.9
The race went forward to a recount, and officials counted in-person votes, provi-
sional ballots, and absentee ballots, and confirmed the previous outcome: that Simonds
won by one vote.10 However, “[t]he next day, a three-judge recount court decided
that a ballot declared ineligible during the recount should” have counted for Yancey,
tying the race.11 Those judges rejected Simonds’s request to reconsider, so with that
tie the election went to the process provided by law—the aforementioned random
drawing that resulted in Yancey’s win.12
A total of 23,896 people voted in that race13—but one absentee ballot had the
potential to decide its outcome, as well as the party makeup of the Virginia House
/video/?439246-1/republican-david-yancey-drawn-winner-virginia-house-delegates-race
[https://perma.cc/MM3B-96RY]. Effective July 1, 2020, tied elections (except for governor,
lieutenant governor, or attorney general) must go to a special election. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 24.2-802.2(H) (West 2020).
3 See Election Tiebreaker for Virginia House Seat, supra note 2, at 05:59.
4 2017 House of Delegates General Election: District 94, VA.DEP’TELECTIONS, https://
historical.elections.virginia.gov/elections/view/88247/ [https://perma.cc/XDP2-8JY2] (last
visited Dec. 8, 2020).
5 Gregory S. Schneider, A Single Vote Leads to a Rare Tie for Control of the Virginia




6 Reema Amin, Lone Absentee Ballot Remains Rejected for 94th District Race, DAILY




9 Schneider, supra note 5.
10 Id.
11 Vozzella, supra note 1.
12 Id.
13 2017 House of Delegates General Election: District 94, supra note 4.
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of Delegates.14 Overall, 192,397 people voted absentee in Virginia’s November 2017
off-year general election.15 Rates of absentee voting are steadily trending upward in
Virginia,16 as well as nationally,17 and as these trends continue, states will have to
address how to deal not just with voter error but with preventing and fixing the state’s
own error when it comes to properly counting absentee ballots.
State error regarding absentee ballots has the potential to play an outsized role in
determining elections. In another Virginia House of Delegates race in 2017, fifty-five
absentee ballots were not counted when they arrived at the Stafford County regis-
trar’s office the day after the election due to postal service error.18 Without counting
the withheld absentee ballots, the Republican candidate was ahead by eighty-two
votes.19 The Democratic campaign sued to have the ballots counted and presented evi-
dence of an email by a county election official to show that the ballots would have
arrived on time “but for the mistake of a government official” at the United States
Postal Service (USPS).20 After county election officials voted not to count the ballots,
a federal judge declined to order a count of the ballots.21 Two years later, that Demo-
cratic candidate, Joshua Cole, won his race for the same district in the House of Dele-
gates.22 Although the absentee votes ultimately did not have the ability to decide the
2017 race,23 it is chilling to consider that anyone’s absentee ballot, properly filled
14 See Amin, supra note 6.
15 Registration/Turnout Reports, VA. DEP’T ELECTIONS, https://www.elections.virginia
.gov/resultsreports/registrationturnout-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/7TQ3-GG93] (last visited
Dec. 8, 2020).
16 See id. In the 2018 general election, 337,315 people voted absentee, nearly 10% of all
votes. Id. That is by far the highest number of absentee voters in Virginia ever recorded in
a non-presidential election. See id. (reporting from 1976 through 2019). In the 2016 general
election, 566,948 people voted absentee in Virginia—14% of the total votes cast and the
highest number of absentee votes since Virginia started tracking that data consistently in 1992.
Id. In 1992, 141,123 absentee votes were cast—0.5% of the total votes cast in that year’s
election. Id.
17 Voting by Mail and Absentee Voting, MITELECTION DATA &SCI.LAB, https://election
lab.mit.edu/research/voting-mail-and-absentee-voting [https://perma.cc/K8KJ-JGVN] (last
visited Dec. 8, 2020). Nationally, votes submitted by mail have risen from approximately
10% of votes in 1992 to over 20% of votes in 2016. Id.
18 Rachel Weiner & Laura Vozzella, Virginia Judge Won’t Force Count of 55 Absentee







22 Democrat Cole Defeats Milde in Key 28th House District Race, FREE-LANCE STAR
(Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.fredericksburg.com/news/local/democrat-cole-defeats-milde-in
-key-th-house-district-race/article_3e340aac-737e-5e53-ac3d-9e8485c6626d.html [https://
perma.cc/8UGF-6GNC].
23 See Weiner & Vozzella, supra note 18.
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out and mailed with enough time, may not count because it was sitting in the post
office by mistake.
Every vote should be counted because of the importance of maintaining demo-
cratic norms and confidence in elections. Aside from normative arguments, absentee
ballot schemes that lack safeguards to address state error regarding absentee ballots
or that have prohibitively restrictive absentee ballot deadlines violate the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.24 Part I of this Note will provide further
background on the landscape of absentee voting laws across the country. This will
show that the ability to amend state error involving absentee ballots depends on
states’ wildly different timelines to request and return ballots and that some of those
timelines are unconstitutionally restrictive. Part II will discuss how Congress may
direct states to administer elections with more safeguards for mailed absentee
ballots. Part III will illustrate how not counting mailed absentee ballots due to state
error or unworkable deadlines is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. Part IV will provide solutions to address these constitutional
violations—namely, reforms at the state and federal levels that would expand the
window to request and return an absentee ballot and implement safeguards to count
certain mailed absentee ballots as provisional ballots.
I. HOW STATES HANDLE MAIL-IN ABSENTEE BALLOTS
While absentee voting is increasing in popularity,25 it has long been a staple of
the American election system.26 Farmers and frontiersmen during the seventeenth
century voted absentee while the colonies were still under English rule.27 Twenty
states implemented excused absentee voting by the end of World War I.28 By 1972,
two states allowed no-excuse absentee voting.29 Now, all fifty states have some form
of absentee voting, thirty-four of which allow no-excuse absentee voting.30 As more
people vote absentee, states need to find a way to ensure that every vote is indeed
24 See generally infra Part III.
25 Voting by Mail and Absentee Voting, supra note 17.
26 See Dotty LeMieux, Absentee Voting in the Twenty-First Century, in 1 VOTING IN
AMERICA 83, 83 (Morgan E. Felchner ed., 2008).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Absentee Ballot Regimes: Easing Costs or Adding
a Step?, in ELECTIONADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 144, 144 (R. Michael Alvarez
& Bernard Grofman eds., 2014).
30 See Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and Other Voting at Home
Options, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and
-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx [https://perma.cc/7XGZ-5QS9] (Sept. 24, 2020).
Sixteen states require excuses to vote absentee; thirty-four states and the District of Columbia
do not require an excuse to vote absentee. Id. Five states mail ballots to all eligible voters in
each election. Id.
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counted—because, as illustrated by the tied race in Virginia in 2017, as well as numer-
ous other close races up and down the ballot over the years,31 every vote truly matters.
A. State Error: Misdelivery and Misprinting
State error that causes otherwise valid absentee ballots to not be counted is not
limited to a one-time mistake on the part of the postal service, such as in Stafford
County.32 Errors that can be broadly categorized as misdelivery can have massive
impacts on high-stakes elections. A particularly striking example of absentee ballot
delivery issues is what happened in Florida’s 2018 general election. Voters in multiple
counties never received their absentee ballots, even though they requested the ballots
before the deadline.33 Other voters received the ballots too late to return them in time
to count.34 Additional voters mailed their ballots within the specified time frame, but
their votes still were not counted, for unexplained reasons.35 After the election, 266
absentee ballots were found in a USPS facility; people speculated that it was not a
lone incident.36 It is concerning when mail errors impact absentee ballots in one race
for a state legislative seat, such as in Stafford County.37 It is much more concerning
when similar errors affect ballots across a state in elections as impactful and hotly
contested as Florida’s 2018 statewide races (not to mention the various other local
races on those ballots).38
In addition to delivery problems, states have struggled with misprinting basic
information on absentee ballots. When absentee ballots for New Hampshire’s 2018
general election were mailed to voters, the ballots mistakenly listed a Democrat who
31 See Domenico Montanaro, Why Every Vote Matters—the Election Decided by a Single
Vote (or a Little More), NPR, https://www.npr.org/2018/11/03/663709392/why-every-vote
-matters-the-elections-decided-by-a-single-vote-or-a-little-more [https://perma.cc/H3EX
-WJWM] (Nov. 10, 2018, 4:15 PM). Over a dozen races in the past twenty years alone have
been decided by a single vote or ended in a tie. Id.
32 See Weiner & Vozzella, supra note 18.
33 Sarah Blaskey, South Florida’s Absentee-Ballot Blues: ‘I Am Infuriated that I Was Not





37 See Weiner & Vozzella, supra note 18.
38 The senate, gubernatorial, and agricultural commissioner races were so close that they
caused Florida’s first full, statewide recount. Frances Robles & Patricia Mazzei, Florida Begins
Vote Recounts in Senate and Governor’s Races, N.Y.TIMES (Nov. 10, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/11/10/us/florida-senate-governor-votes-recount.html [https://perma.cc/U2FZ
-CHW5]. A few days later, with the senate race’s margin of 0.15%, the state ordered a manual
recount for that race. Frances Robles, Glenn Thrush & Audra D.S. Burch, Recount Ordered in
Florida Senate Race as Governor’s Contest Nears End, N.Y.TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/us/florida-recount.html [https://perma.cc/22AB-Y4JM].
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had lost the primary as the Democratic candidate for the general election.39 Addi-
tionally, a different Democratic candidate was listed in the wrong party column, and
another Democratic candidate was listed with the wrong party label.40 Although the
ballots were replaced in a few days, at that point the federal deadline for overseas
absentee ballots had passed, restricting an entire class of people from voting.41 In
California’s 2016 general election, some absentee voters were sent the right ballots,
but they contained the wrong voter’s name.42 Between misprints and misdeliveries,
there are a lot of ways a state can err in delivering and returning absentee ballots,
with minimal safeguards.
B. Disenfranchisement by Deadline
Aside from what may be categorized as state error (misdelivery, misprinting,
and other mistakes), there are state laws that lead to too-late delivery of otherwise
valid absentee ballots.43 This is like a more sinister form of misdelivery by the state,
because the voter is less likely to be aware of, and thus be able to correct, the problem.
In Pennsylvania, thousands of voters every year had their absentee ballots rejected
because of the state’s extremely tight deadlines to request (by 5 p.m. the Tuesday before
the election) and return (by 5 p.m. the Friday before the election) absentee ballots.44
The ACLU of Pennsylvania and the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law, together with nine voters whose absentee ballots did not arrive in time for the
November 2018 election, sued the state in 2019 to prevent that type of disenfran-
chisement from occurring in future elections.45 The plaintiffs argued that the restric-
tive absentee ballot deadlines violated the state’s constitution, the First Amendment,
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 The plaintiffs
39 Voting Advocates Say Absentee Ballot Errors Demonstrate Flaws in System, CONCORD





42 See Matt Bloom, Missing Your Mail-In Ballot? You’re Not Alone, KPCC (Nov. 8,
2016), https://www.scpr.org/news/2016/11/08/66006/missing-your-mail-in-ballot-you-re-not
-alone/ [https://perma.cc/5256-8KKP]. In one family, a mother and her daughters requested
absentee ballots, but they were each sent an absentee ballot for the mother. Id.
43 See, e.g., Jonathan Lai, Are Pa.’s Absentee-Ballot Deadlines Unconstitutional? Judges






46 Lai, supra note 43.
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further contended that the deadlines were an unconstitutional burden on the funda-
mental right to vote because they resulted in complete disenfranchisement.47 Judges
heard oral arguments in that case in June 2019,48 but before they ruled on it, the state
passed a bipartisan election reform law that overhauled Pennsylvania’s absentee
ballot scheme, effective as of April 2020.49
The new law allows voters to cast no-excuse absentee ballots up to fifty days before
an election.50 The law also extends the deadline to return absentee ballots from 5 p.m.
the Friday before the election to 8 p.m. on Election Day.51 This moved Pennsylvania
from having one of the shortest absentee ballot windows in the country52 to having
the longest absentee ballot window in the country.53
Providing more flexible timing for accepting absentee ballots should allow the
state to stop disenfranchising absentee voters who cannot meet the prohibitively
restrictive deadlines. Pennsylvania’s new law shows that bipartisan reform expand-
ing absentee mail-in voting is a possibility for states, even those with mixed-party
executive and legislative branches.54 Such reform could look like Pennsylvania’s
new law, opening the window to request an absentee ballot far enough out from the
election so the state has sufficient time to correct any errors.55 New laws should also
extend the time in which the state will accept valid absentee ballots.
Absentee ballot reform is trending—after Virginia secured an all-Democratic
government in 2019, legislators passed a slew of changes to the absentee voting
scheme. Both chambers of the legislature passed measures replacing the law man-
dating pre-approved, excused absentee voting with no-excuse absentee voting.56 The
47 See Petition for Review at ¶¶ 103–06, Jones v. Torres, No. 717 MD 2018 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. Nov. 13, 2018).
48 Lai, supra note 43.
49 Evan Simko-Bednarski, Overhaul of Election Laws Find Bipartisan Support in the
Battleground State of Pennsylvania, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/01/_politics-zone
-injection/pennsylvania-election-overhaul/index.html [https://perma.cc/X9UP-GA48] (Nov. 1,
2019, 4:05 PM).
50 Id.
51 See Lai, supra note 43; Simko-Bednarski, supra note 49.
52 David Murrell, New Online Absentee Ballot Request Makes Voting in Pa. . . . Margin-
ally Easier, PHILA.MAG.(Sept. 17, 2019, 3:38 PM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2019
/09/17/pennsylvania-absentee-ballot-online/ [https://perma.cc/NX25-GJWQ].
53 Simko-Bednarski, supra note 49.
54 Id. (noting Pennsylvania’s Democratic governor and the Republican state senate
majority leader).
55 See id.
56 Dean Mirshahi, Bill Allowing No-Excuse Absentee Voting Passes Virginia Senate,
WRIC, https://www.wric.com/news/politics/capitol-connection/bill-allowing-no-excuse-ab
sentee-voting-passes-virginia-senate/ [https://perma.cc/5FVB-3R9B] (Jan. 20, 2020, 4:28
PM); Max Smith, House Approves Significant Absentee Voting Expansion, WTOP (Jan. 31,
2020, 4:12 AM), https://wtop.com/virginia/2020/01/va-house-approves-significant-absentee
-voting-expansion/ [https://perma.cc/TNY2-R95X].
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state will accept absentee ballots that were postmarked before close of polls until
noon the Friday after the election (instead of only accepting absentee ballots until
close of polls).57 One other significant change is that instead of allowing voters to
apply online or by mail to vote absentee up to a week before an election, voters will
have to apply at least eleven days before an election.58 These laws are now in effect.59
The through line in both Pennsylvania’s and Virginia’s absentee ballot reforms
is creating a more flexible deadline for the voter to request and mail the ballot and
for the state to receive the ballot.60 Overly restrictive deadlines end up disenfranchising
voters even when voters have timely requested and mailed back the ballot, because
the state may not receive it by the deadline for the registrar. These timelines become
compounded when there is state error like misdelivery or misprinting.
One complicating factor in ensuring timely delivery of an absentee ballot is that
before a voter may return an absentee ballot, they must first apply for and be ap-
proved to receive one.61 Methods of applying differ by state, varyingly allowing voters
to apply in-person, by mail, or online.62
For voters who want to apply by mail to vote absentee, Rhode Island’s deadline
to return an application is the earliest among the states—twenty-one days before the
election.63 Texas, Nebraska, Idaho, and Arizona—and now Virginia64—hover around
the middle of all the states, with deadlines to mail in the absentee ballot application
eleven days before Election Day.65 Keeping in mind the size of those western states,
and other states with farther-out deadlines, a buffer time makes sense so that officials
can process and send out ballots in time for voters to receive the ballots before the
election. Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, South Dakota,
57 H.B. 238, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020); Smith, supra note 56.
58 H.B. 239, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020). Another bill created an excep-
tion for emergencies that prevent residents from voting after the application deadline. H.B.
242, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020).
59 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-701, 703, 705–07, 710 (West 2020); see also H.B. 207,
2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) (“Any registered voter may vote by absentee
ballot in accordance with the provisions of this chapter . . . .” (emphasis added)).
60 See Simko-Bednarski, supra note 49; Smith, supra note 56.
61 See generally Absentee Ballot Deadlines, VOTE.ORG, https://www.vote.org/absentee
-ballot-deadlines/ [https://perma.cc/V85R-APNT] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020) (listing state
deadlines for absentee ballot application).
62 Id.
63 Absentee Ballot Deadlines, supra note 61; Apply for a Mail Ballot, R.I.BD.ELECTIONS,
https://www.elections.ri.gov/voting/applymail.php [https://perma.cc/8T8T-KXQ3] (last
visited Dec. 8, 2020). There is an exception for emergencies, but voters must apply in-person
and may not mail the absentee ballot to the board of elections. Emergency Mail Ballot, R.I.
BD.ELECTIONS, https://www.elections.ri.gov/voting/emergency.php [https://perma.cc/A795
-KC86] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020) (“A voter may apply for an emergency mail ballot by ob-
taining an application from their local Board of Canvassers.”).
64 H.B. 239, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020).
65 Absentee Ballot Deadlines, supra note 61.
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Vermont, and Wyoming all require that voters’ mailed-in applications to vote ab-
sentee be received by the day before Election Day—but also require that absentee
ballots be received by the state on Election Day.66 That is a completely unworkable
timeline for voters who submit mail applications on the last possible day.
The online application deadlines can be just as confounding as the mailed appli-
cation deadlines. In Arkansas, voters can apply to vote absentee up until the day
before the election if they do so in person, but they have to apply seven days before the
election if they apply online.67 By the time voters apply online a week out, there still
might not be enough time for their application to be processed, for the voter to receive
the ballot, and for the state to receive the completed ballot back by the final deadline.68
After a voter has been approved to receive an absentee ballot, and the state has
mailed it to them, the final deadline to return the absentee ballot varies greatly from
state to state. In some states, absentee ballots must arrive at the clerk’s office by the
day before the election, while in other states, ballots may arrive up to ten days after
the election.69 To reiterate, depending on how late voters are allowed to apply to
vote absentee, and when the state sends out the absentee ballot, many voters may
end up being completely disenfranchised, through no fault of their own, if they
receive their ballot so late that it cannot be delivered by the state’s final deadline to
count it.70 The burden should not be on voters who have timely applied for absentee
ballots to then ensure that their ballots are received by the state by an essentially un-
workable deadline. States should accommodate voters who comply with their dead-
lines to apply for an absentee ballot and then mail in their ballots by allowing for a
few more days to count ballots.
Despite the hurdles to vote absentee, nearly 18% of voters nationwide voted
absentee in the November 2016 election.71 So why do so many people vote absentee?
It may be difficult (or impossible) for a voter to get to their voting precinct on Election
Day, especially since elections are generally held on a workday.72 Even if a voter
66 Id.
67 Elections, ARK. SEC’Y STATE, https://www.sos.arkansas.gov/elections/voter-informa
tion/absentee-voting [https://perma.cc/S7GP-9FED] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
68 If a voter ballot is mailed by the USPS via First-Class Mail, it could take up to three
days for the voter to receive the ballot; returning the ballot could take the same amount of
time. Mail & Ship, U.S. POSTAL SERV., https://www.usps.com/ship/ [https://perma.cc/SD5S
-F9QK] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
69 Absentee Ballot Deadlines, supra note 61.
70 See id. (South Dakota, for example, accepts applications received one day before
Election Day but returned ballots must be received on Election Day.).
71 EAVS Deep Dive: Early, Absentee and Mail Voting, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE
COMM’N 2 (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.eac.gov/documents/2017/10/17/eavs-deep-dive
-early-absentee-and-mail-voting-data-statutory-overview/ [https://perma.cc/L7SG-X6AJ].
72 See CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46413, ELECTION DAY: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1
(2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46413.pdf [https://perma.cc/PSH9-B3BW].
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can get to their precinct, prohibitively long wait times might make it impossible for
them to stay and vote.73 As a global pandemic has gripped the United States, absentee
voting has only become a more urgent need.74
Virginia’s excuses to vote absentee, although now defunct,75 illustrate in more de-
tail why voters need the ability to vote absentee—and have those votes counted. These
are some of the excuses that allowed a Virginia resident, at one point, to vote absentee:
the voter was a student outside the locality, the voter had business outside the locality
on Election Day, or the voter was working and commuting for eleven or more hours
while the polls were open.76 These were a few among the twenty permissible excuses.77
Some of these reasons were known far enough ahead of Election Day to send in an
absentee ballot application, and return a timely ballot, but others were not—an
example being if a voter received a last-minute shift and was going to work through-
out the time polls were open.78
If a voter lives in one of the sixteen states that still requires an excuse to vote
absentee,79 once a voter knows they are allowed to vote absentee, they must still meet
other requirements that vary by state to receive their ballot. In Virginia, for example,
you must be registered to vote prior to applying for an absentee ballot.80 Residents
of Virginia must wait five days between registering to vote and applying in-person
for an absentee ballot.81 Additionally, in state elections, some first-time voters are
not allowed to vote absentee by mail.82 The changes to Virginia’s absentee ballot
scheme did not change these requirements.83 These requirements, plus the deadlines
73 See Leighley & Nagler, supra note 29, at 145.
74 See Pam Fessler, The Legal Fight over Voting Rights During the Pandemic Is Getting Hot-
ter, NPR (May 2, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/02/849090889/the-legal-fight
-over-voting-rights-during-the-pandemic-is-getting-hotter [https://perma.cc/X2QN-9XGB].
75 See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
76 H.B. 207, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020).
77 Id. Though the statute had twelve numbered excuses, these were often broken out into
twenty to account for variants such as being an out-of-state student or her spouse. See, e.g.,
Virginia Absentee Ballot Application Form, VA. DEP’T ELECTIONS (July 2017), https://www
.alexandriava.gov/uploadedFiles/elections/AB%20Application%20701%20Fillable.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V46M-FKX8].
78 Absentee and Early Voting, VA.DEP’TELECTIONS, https://www.elections.virginia.gov
/casting-a-ballot/absentee-voting/ [https://perma.cc/FNX4-S9SP] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
79 VOPP: Table 2: Excuses to Vote Absentee, NAT’L CONF.STATE LEGISLATURES, https://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-2-excuses-to-vote-absentee.aspx
[https://perma.cc/P42H-VB4N] (Apr. 20, 2020).
80 See Frequently Asked Questions About Absentee Voting, VA.DEP’TELECTIONS, https://
www.elections.virginia.gov/media/absentee-landing-page/FAQ_absentee_voting.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VNY5-PULK] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
81 VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-701 (West 2020). The statute refers only to in-person voting, but
it is likely that online registration requires the same waiting period to request an absentee ballot.
82 Absentee and Early Voting, supra note 78.
83 See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
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to request and return absentee ballots, add barriers to absentee voting and exacerbate
the time crunch to count absentee ballots.84
Before the recent changes to the absentee voting scheme in Virginia, once a
voter timely sent in their absentee ballot application, met all the requirements, and
was approved to vote absentee, like in the majority of states,85 their ballot had to be
returned to the registrar’s office by close of polls on Election Day.86 Virginia law
now provides an exception to count late absentee ballots that meet certain require-
ments.87 Before the 2020 legislative updates, the exception applied only to any
absentee ballot (1) received after the polls closed, (2) received before 5 p.m. on the
second business day before the state board certifies election results, (3) requested
on or before but not sent by the deadline for making absentee ballots available, and
(4) cast by an eligible absentee voter.88
For the third requirement, the deadline for making absentee ballots available was
no later than forty-five days before an election, or within three business days of the
receipt of a properly completed absentee ballot application (whichever came later).89
Reading the plain language of the statute that created the exception together with the
statute that created the deadline for making absentee ballots available, an absentee
ballot (1) received between the time polls closed and nine days after the election, (2)
that was requested on or before but not sent by forty-five days before the election or
within three business days of the receipt of a properly completed absentee ballot appli-
cation, and (3) cast by an eligible voter, would have been counted.90 That excluded
any absentee ballots that were requested within the actual time frame that was pro-
vided to request absentee ballots, unless the ballot was not sent within three business
days from the date the voter’s absentee ballot application was received by the state91—
and most voters likely, still, do not know when their applications are received.92
This could have discounted many absentee ballots that were received after the
final deadline, even if a ballot was mailed by the state without enough time for the
voter to return it. In contrast, a properly completed absentee ballot returned by the
84 See Absentee Ballot Deadlines, supra note 61.
85 Id.
86 See Smith, supra note 56.
87 VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-709(B)–(C) (West 2020).
88 Id. § 24.2-709 (West 2019). The Virginia Board of Elections certifies results the third
Monday of the month of the election, id. § 24.2-679(A) (West 2020), putting the final
deadline to receive a completed ballot nine days after Election Day.
89 Id. § 24.2-612 (West 2019). This language is the same in the 2020 update. See id.
(West 2020).
90 See id. §§ 24.2-612, 709 (West 2019).
91 See id.
92 But see Absentee and Early Voting, supra note 78 (If applying by mail, Virginia’s
“Citizen Portal” shows whether an application has been received. It is unknown how many
absentee voters utilize this functionality.).
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deadline from a voter who died before that day would be counted.93 It makes no sense
to count the absentee votes of dead citizens but not ensure better safeguards to count
the votes of living citizens who are actually impacted by the results of the election
in which they are voting.
Virginia legislators noticed that the absentee ballot deadline was prohibitively
restrictive for many voters and updated it in 2020.94 Now, any valid absentee ballot
(1) returned to the registrar after the close of polls, but before noon on the third day
after an election, and (2) postmarked on or before the election date will be counted.95
This language was merely added in, arguably creating further confusion about what
late absentee ballots should be counted.
In the 2018 general election, “374,308 Virginians requested an absentee ballot . . .
a record for nonpresidential election years.”96 Only 337,315 of those voters returned
their ballots in time to be counted—less than the total amount of absentee ballots
requested, but nearly 10% of the total votes counted.97 Of those absentee ballots,
about 42% were submitted by mail (as opposed to being submitted in person by the
voter or a designated representative).98 The state received 6,771 absentee ballots in
the four weeks following Election Day, nearly all of which were received by mail.99
Those late absentee ballots represent a lot of uncounted votes with the power to
decide elections.100
It is important to remember that those numbers were for a midterm elec-
tion—absentee voting is much higher in presidential years.101 Counting every vote,
including mailed absentee ballots, will be an especially pressing need in 2020 and
beyond. At the time of writing, the 2020 election was “poised to have the highest
turnout in a century.”102 In Virginia, voter complaints about incidents involving
absentee ballots increased greatly going into the 2016 presidential election—from
three complaints in the 2015 off-year election to sixty-one in 2016.103
93 § 24.2-709(D) (West 2019). This is still true under the amended statute. Id. § 24.2
-709(C) (West 2020).
94 See id. § 24.2-709.
95 Id. § 24.2-709(B).
96 Post-Election Report, VA. DEP’T ELECTIONS 7 (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.elections
.virginia.gov/media/formswarehouse/maintenance-reports/Post-ElectionReportNovember
2018rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2F4-HAAR].
97 Id.; Registration/Turnout Reports, supra note 15.
98 VA. DEP’T ELECTIONS, supra note 96, at 4.
99 Id.
100 See Montanaro, supra note 31.
101 Registration/Turnout Reports, supra note 15.
102 Nate Cohn, Huge Turnout Is Expected in 2020. So Which Party Would Benefit?, N.Y.
TIMES (July 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/upshot/2020-election-turnout
-analysis.html [https://perma.cc/XL4T-L6WK].
103 VA. DEP’T ELECTIONS, supra note 96, at 13. Complaints decreased to eighteen in 2017
and twenty-six in 2018. Id.
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Although Virginia’s absentee ballot laws recently changed,104 the pre-2020 scheme
illustrated the problems with unworkable absentee ballot deadlines in states across the
country. The newly passed laws, like Pennsylvania’s recent reforms, pave a path for-
ward that other states should follow.105 States need to address problems that essentially
purge mailed absentee ballots, given how often states’ own mistakes and conflicting
deadlines cause absentee voter disenfranchisement through no fault of the voter.106
II. CONGRESS’S ELECTION ADMINISTRATION POWERS
Congress has the power to regulate federal elections through the Elections Clause
of the Constitution.107 The Elections Clause states, “The Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of ch[oo]sing Senators.”108 Congress
has utilized this power a few times to standardize election administration practices
across the country, including to pass the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).109 The
Clause suggests that states could have different election systems for federal offices and
state or local offices, but because of the significant administrative burden, Congress has
generally expected states to adopt the federal election regulations for all elections.110
Congress passed HAVA in 2002 in response to the contentious 2000 presidential
election.111 The law authorized $3.86 billion in aid to help states modernize their
election administration, with the key goal of ensuring uniform and nondiscriminatory
federal election administration.112 The federal funding was tied to requirements that
states “update voting equipment, mandate that first-time voters who register by mail
show photo identification, offer provisional ballots to voters whose eligibility is in ques-
tion, post voting information at polling locations, maintain statewide voter registra-
tion lists, and establish complaint procedures for those who experience problems in
104 See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
105 See Simko-Bednarski, supra note 49.
106 See Absentee Ballot Deadlines, supra note 61.
107 KATHLEEN HALE,ROBERT MONTJOY &MITCHELL BROWN, ADMINISTERING ELECTIONS
55 (2015).
108 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
109 See HALE ET AL., supra note 107, at 77. Congress has only passed a few laws that ex-
plicitly address election administration: the Voting Rights Act, the Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act (later amended by the Military and Overseas Voting Empower-
ment Act), the National Voter Registration Act, and HAVA. Id.
110 HALE ET AL., supra note 107, at 55.
111 GLENN H. UTTER & RUTH ANN STRICKLAND, CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION REFORM
30–31 (2d ed. 2008).
112 Id. at 31.
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voting,” among other requirements.113 The law also created the United States Election
Assistance Commission (EAC).114
HAVA did not do much regarding absentee voting—it mandated some reporting
on absentee voting and amended portions of The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act.115 However, both Democrats and Republicans agreed that part
of the main goal of the law was to enact “provisions for voters to correct errors in
their voting.”116 This goal made sense in the aftermath of the presidential recount in
Florida, which was caused mainly by voter error that stemmed from confusion over
how to properly fill out the ballot.117
Part of this error correction included a requirement that states provide provi-
sional ballots to voters who believe they are registered but do not appear on the
voter list at the polls.118 There are a variety of reasons why voter names may not show
up on the voter list—for example, voters might be mistakenly removed from the regis-
try due to state error with data entry or general administration.119 The provisional
ballots mandated by HAVA are “a counterweight to the possibility of [such] clerical
errors.”120 Additionally, if courts order polls to stay open late, people who vote later
than the original closing time must vote provisionally.121
Provisional ballots are kept separate from other ballots until the eligibility of the
voter is determined by checking registration records.122 Once the voter’s eligibility
is determined, the state must notify the voter in writing whether their vote did or did
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 703, 116 Stat. 1666,
1723–24.
116 Warren Christopher, Opinion, The Stalling of Election Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15,
2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/15/opinion/the-stalling-of-election-reform.html
[https://perma.cc/GDU3-GXA5].
117 In the 2000 presidential election, there were numerous instances of voter error with
Florida’s voting machines, leading to the presidential recount in the state. Many ballots were
not perforated all the way (“hanging” or “dimpled” chads), but there was no way for voters
to report their intent after the state realized the error and tried to interpret voter intent. See
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105–06 (2000) (per curiam); Ron Elving, The Florida Recount
of 2000: A Nightmare that Goes on Haunting, NPR, https://www.npr.org/2018/11/12/66681
2854/the-florida-recount-of-2000-a-nightmare-that-goes-on-haunting [https://perma.cc/G6CV
-HARM] (Nov. 12, 2008, 5:00 AM). Although the mistakes were characterized as voter error,
that is not a fair characterization—the punch card voting machines were quite confusing and
onerous to use. The machines had been invented for accounting before World War II and
were incredibly flawed for voting purposes. See RICHARDL.HASEN, THE VOTING WARS:FROM
FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 12 (2012).
118 MARTHA KROPF & DAVID C. KIMBALL, HELPING AMERICA VOTE: THE LIMITS OF
ELECTION REFORM 26 (2011).
119 Id.
120 HALE ET AL., supra note 107, at 88.
121 KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 118, at 26.
122 Id.
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not count.123 States may create their own timeline for when election officials must
verify whether a provisional ballot will count before certifying election results.124
HAVA is enforced through § 1983 litigation, so a citizen may bring a claim when their
constitutional right to vote is deprived by an official administering the election.125
Taken together, these requirements may seem like a lot of safeguards to impose
on states, especially considering how little federal legislation addresses election admin-
istration.126 However, the provisional ballot safeguards enacted in HAVA were
deemed necessary to balance two vital goals: preventing eligible voters from being
denied the right to vote and preventing voter fraud.127 Requiring all states to provide
“provisional ballots ostensibly created a more uniform ability to vote, given the varia-
tion in state rules about voter eligibility.”128 Unfortunately, a lack of guidance from
the EAC on when “provisional ballots should be issued or counted” has resulted in
states creating a variety of situations that allow (or do not allow) provisional voting.129
HAVA’s provisional voting framework should serve as the foundation for federal
legislation increasing uniformity in how states handle mailed absentee ballots.130
While HAVA passed somewhat expeditiously for federal legislation,131 it seems
unlikely that bipartisan election reform will become law any time soon given the
current gridlock in the federal government.132 Therefore, states should take the lead
123 Id.
124 Id. at 27.
125 See John Stone, Civil Rights: Help America Vote Act Creates Individual Right Enforce-
able Through § 1983, NAT’L LEGAL RSCH. GRP., INC. (Mar. 15, 2016, 1:03 PM), http://www
.nlrg.com/public-law-legal-research/civil-rights-help-america-vote-act-creates-individual
-right-enforceable-through-1983 [https://perma.cc/GH9X-KSUQ].
126 See HALE ET AL., supra note 107, at 77.
127 See KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 118, at 24.
128 HALE ET AL., supra note 107, at 88.
129 See id.
130 See generally Charles Stewart III, What Hath HAVA Wrought? Consequences, Intended
and Not, of the Post–Bush v. Gore Reforms, in ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE STATE OF REFORM AFTER BUSH V. GORE 79, 79–81, 83–85 (R. Michael Alvarez
& Bernard Grofman eds., 2014) (discussing HAVA’s legislative history).
131 Prompted by the 2000 presidential election, the 107th Congress passed HAVA in
January 2002—only a year after that session of Congress commenced following the 2000
election. See id. at 83–85.
132 See Shawn Zeller, Divided Government Will Pose an Obstacle to Lawmaking in 2019,
ROLL CALL (Jan. 3, 2019, 7:03 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/divided-govern
ment-will-pose-obstacle-lawmaking-2019 [https://perma.cc/L2PK-SSDV]. While the House
did pass an election reform package in March 2019 that would change how congressional elec-
tions are funded, impose new state voter-access rules, and mandate disclosure of presidential
candidates’ tax returns, it was passed along party lines and has not received any movement
in the Senate. Mike DeBonis & John Wagner, House Democrats Pass H.R. 1, Their Answer to
Draining the Swamp, WASH.POST (Mar. 8, 2019, 8:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/powerpost/house-democrats-prepare-to-pass-hr-1-their-answer-to-draining-the-swamp/2019
/03/08/740f6b48-415b-11e9-9361-301ffb5bd5e6_story.html [https://perma.cc/XCZ7-2ZZP].
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on updating their election laws to address the increased use of mail-in absentee ballots
to prevent eligible voters from being disenfranchised. However, if states do not reform
their absentee ballot laws, then Congress should amend HAVA or pass a similar law
that would standardize mail-in absentee ballot procedures.
III. DISENFRANCHISEMENT BY STATE ERROR AND UNWORKABLE DEADLINES
VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. The Fundamental Right to Vote: Changing Standards for Evaluating State
Election Laws
A long line of cases establishes that voting is a fundamental right protected by
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.133 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme
Court emphasized the right to vote’s unique importance as a fundamental right that
is preservative of all other rights.134 Two years later in Harper v. Virginia State Board
of Elections, the Court declared, “[T]he right to vote is too precious, too fundamen-
tal to be so burdened or conditioned.”135 Election law scholars agree that Reynolds
and Harper established that voting is a fundamental right, burdens on which are
subject to heightened scrutiny.136
In the modern era, the fundamental right to vote was reinforced at the Supreme
Court in Bush v. Gore.137 The opinion in Bush emphasized, “When the state legislature
vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has
prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal
weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.”138 Bush’s
holding was narrow: it invalidated Florida’s recount procedures on equal protection
grounds just to be applied to the facts of the 2000 presidential recount in Florida.139
The holding, however, expressed the potentially expansive nature of the right to vote:
133 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886)). This was reinforced again in Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 670 (1966).
134 377 U.S. at 561–62 (“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a
free and democratic society. . . . Almost a century ago . . . the Court referred to ‘the political
franchise of voting’ as ‘a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.’”
(quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370)).
135 383 U.S. at 670.
136 E.g., DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN, DANIEL P. TOKAJI & NICHOLAS
STEPHANOPOULOS, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 394 (6th ed. 2017).
137 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) (The opinion specifically discussed the funda-
mental right to vote for president.).
138 Id. at 104.
139 Id. at 109 (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem
of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”); see
HASEN, supra note 117, at 136 (noting that the “Court tried to limit the reach of its holding”).
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The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation
of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of
its exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms,
the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value
one person’s vote over that of another.140
The differences in how ballots were being recounted across Florida did not meet
the “minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure
the fundamental right” under the Equal Protection Clause.141 The recount process
failed to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause because (1) the state lacked uniform
rules to determine the intent of voters when determining whether to count a ballot,
(2) the second recount counted votes differently from the first recount, (3) the final
recount was not guaranteed to count all votes, and (4) the people conducting the
recount were not necessarily equipped to satisfactorily complete it.142 All those issues
taken together were unconstitutional because they allowed one person’s vote to be
valued more than another person’s vote.143
The Bush decision illustrated important applications for the right to vote in terms
of election administration, mainly that equal protection applies to the manner of the
exercise of the vote—a state may not value one person’s vote over another by
“arbitrary and disparate treatment.”144 Additionally, the desire for speed is not an
excuse for ignoring equal protection guarantees.145 The opinion emphasized the
necessity of at least minimum procedural safeguards to protect the fundamental right
of each voter.146 Election law scholar Richard Hasen called this “a new equal pro-
tection right to some kind of rudimentary fairness in the nuts and bolts of elections.”147
Although Bush’s precedential value has, unfortunately, been minimal,148 its unique
140 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05 (citing Harper, 383 U.S. at 665). The opinion also stated that
the right to vote “can be denied by a debasement . . . of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as
by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” Id. at 105 (citing Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
141 Id.
142 See Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in
Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 384–85 (2002).
143 HASEN, supra note 117, at 136.
144 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
145 Id. at 108.
146 Id. at 109.
147 HASEN, supra note 117, at 136.
148 Bush v. Gore as legal precedent, ironically, does not appear to be the
cause of much of the rise in litigation. . . . [F]ew of the lawsuits since
2000 actually have led to successful Bush v. Gore claims, and most
lower courts have read the case narrowly when it has come up.
Id. Hasen previously predicted (correctly) that the decision would have little precedential
value. See generally Hasen, supra note 142, at 386–92 (discussing reasons why commentators’
“optimism [was] entirely understandable,” but ultimately unwarranted).
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equal protection analysis should serve as a framework for ensuring that a state does
not value one person’s vote over another by “arbitrary and disparate treatment”149—
regardless of the type of election or method of casting a ballot. Specifically, it
should ensure that states do not value in-person voters’ ballots over absentee voters’
ballots by arbitrary and disparate treatment.
Bush’s equal protection analysis did not directly use the more traditional balancing
test for equal protection challenges to election administration,150 but that test—the
Anderson-Burdick test—seems to still be the applicable standard.151 The Anderson-
Burdick test comes out of two cases152: Anderson v. Celebrezze153 and Burdick v.
Takushi.154 In Anderson, Ohio supporters of independent presidential candidate John
Anderson met the substantive requirements to put his name on the ballot, but the
statutory deadline to qualify as an independent candidate passed before he met those
requirements.155 Anderson challenged the early filing deadline as an unconstitutional
burden on the voting and associational rights of his supporters.156 The Court applied
a balancing test to determine the deadline’s constitutionality:
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must
identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In
passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legiti-
macy and strength of each of those interests, it also must con-
sider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden the plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all these factors
is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the chal-
lenged provision is unconstitutional.157
149 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
150 See id. at 104–05 (applying an “arbitrary an disparate treatment” standard); see also
Rachel Provencher & John Hardin Young, The Administrative Challenges for Recounts, in
AMERICA VOTES!:CHALLENGES TO MODERN ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 58, 63–65
(Benjamin E. Griffith ed., 3d ed. 2016).
151 See Provencher & Young, supra note 150, at 65 (arguing that in 2008, the Court agreed
unanimously on Anderson-Burdick’s applicability, despite division over the test’s application).
See generally Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
152 See Provencher & Young, supra note 150, at 63–64.
153 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
154 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
155 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782.
156 Id. at 782–83.
157 Id. at 789 (citations omitted).
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In this case, the injury to Anderson and his supporters outweighed the interests put for-
ward by the state: voter education, equal treatment for partisan and independent candi-
dates, and political stability.158 Thus, the Court found the deadline unconstitutional.159
Later, in Burdick, the Court applied and refined Anderson’s standard.160 The
slightly modified balancing test clarified that the standard in Anderson should be
used to determine the level of scrutiny applied to the challenged state election law.161
When the challenged state election law severely burdens the right to vote, the law will
receive a stricter form of scrutiny.162 When the challenged law “imposes only
‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights of voters,” it is subject to a less strict review.163 Using the test, the Court
found that Hawaii’s practice of banning write-in votes was not sufficiently burden-
some, and the state’s reason for banning such votes—including preventing unre-
strained factionalism—was compelling enough to justify it.164
To summarize the Anderson-Burdick test: First, a court must evaluate how severe
the burden or injury is on the right to vote.165 If there is a high burden, the Court
“require[s] that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
interest.”166 If the law does not burden many voters or is easy to address, the state
merely needs a relevant interest.167 Second, the court must identify and evaluate the
precise interests put forward by the state as justifications for the burden, and then
decide if the law is unconstitutional.168 This is a fact-intensive inquiry.169
Eight years after Bush, the Supreme Court once again applied the Anderson-
Burdick test when it considered a challenge to an Indiana election administration law
in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.170 In Crawford, the plaintiffs alleged
that a state law in Indiana that required citizens voting in person on Election Day or
casting an early ballot in person to present photo identification unduly burdened the
right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment.171 The plaintiffs argued that the
carve-out the state gave to voters who did not have photo IDs was too difficult to
execute.172 The exception required a lot of travel, especially for voters who may not
158 See id. at 796, 805–06.
159 See id. at 805–06.
160 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992).
161 See id.
162 See id. at 434.
163 See id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
164 See id. at 438–42.
165 See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
166 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433–34.
167 See id. at 434.
168 See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
169 See id.
170 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
171 See id. at 187 (plurality opinion).
172 See id. at 198.
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have had cars in a location where public transportation was essentially non-existent,
to get to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, which was open during the same hours that
most people work.173 Voters would have to do that for every single election.174 It was
also difficult for residents born out of state to get documents, like their birth certifi-
cates, that they needed to get state IDs, precluding a prospective 43,000 people from
voting.175 The result was that the law “arbitrarily disenfranchise[d] qualified voters.”176
As a solution, Indiana provided free photo IDs to voters that needed IDs.177 In
addition to that remedy, the interests put forward by the state included preventing
voter fraud based on bloated voter rolls caused by the state’s own incompetence,178
modernizing elections, and safeguarding voter confidence.179 The plaintiffs had
strong counterarguments. There was no evidence of in-person voter fraud ever occur-
ring in the state.180 The state mandated criminal sanctions for people who tried to
commit voter fraud, which should have been enough of a deterrent.181 Furthermore,
the bloated voter rolls were the result of the state’s own negligence, and the state
should not burden voters to fix their own error.182
The Court was divided over applying the Anderson-Burdick test in Crawford.183
The plurality opinion considered that the statute could be “unconstitutional for impos-
ing an ‘excessively burdensome requirement[]’ on any specific class of voters.”184
However, the concurrence and two dissents each came to separate conclusions on how
to apply the test,185 leaving its future in question. Upon applying the test, the plural-
ity ultimately upheld the statute based on its application to the majority of voters.186
Using the Anderson-Burdick test, the Court found that the asserted injury was
not severe.187 One reason was that voters’ ability to “cast a provisional ballot provides
an adequate remedy.”188 The Court was also persuaded by the state’s arguments that
the burden was not severe because voters could get free IDs and that a trip to the
Bureau of Motor Vehicles was a mere inconvenience.189 Although the Court noted
173 See id. at 198, 200.
174 See id. at 199 n.19.
175 Id. at 187–88.
176 Id. at 187.
177 Id. at 186.
178 See id. at 234 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 191 (plurality opinion).
180 Id. at 194.
181 See id. at 194–95.
182 See id. at 196–97.
183 See Provencher & Young, supra note 150, at 65.
184 Id. (quoting Crawford, 533 U.S. at 202).
185 Id.
186 Crawford, 533 U.S. at 204.
187 See id. at 197–200.
188 Id. at 197–98.
189 See id. at 198.
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that a heavier burden would fall on some voters, especially elderly voters, the Court
emphasized the importance of provisional ballots as a lifeline to save the law.190
Thus, Indiana needed only a relevant interest to uphold the law.191 The Court analyzed
the state’s purported interests192 and evaluated them as sufficient justification for the
allegedly minor burden.193 The Court decided the state’s interests were sufficiently
strong to reject the challenge and uphold the voter ID law.194
A case out of the Sixth Circuit about the counting of provisional ballots, Hunter
v. Hamilton County Board of Elections,195 shows how courts should apply Bush’s
arbitrary and disparate treatment standard to a wider range of election administration
procedures, either replacing or adding to the Anderson-Burdick analysis.196 In a con-
tested judicial election, the Hamilton County Board of Elections counted certain
provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct because of “clear pollworker error,”
but refused to investigate others that may have been subjected to the same type of
error.197 The Sixth Circuit’s opinion used the Bush analysis to emphasize the need
for standard procedure in the counting of votes.198 The opinion noted the importance
of “‘specific standards to ensure . . . equal application’ particularly ‘necessary to
protect the fundamental right of each voter’ to have his or her vote count on equal
terms.”199 Otherwise, the “lack of specific standards for reviewing provisional ballots
can . . . result in ‘unequal evaluation of ballots.’”200
The judge emphasized that “the cause for constitutional concern is much greater
when” deciding issues of “‘casting and counting . . . ballots,’ like evaluating evi-
dence of poll-worker error.”201 The solution was not to discount all ballots cast in
error, but rather to count more potentially erroneously cast ballots.202 As in Bush, the
election process could not involve “‘arbitrary and disparate treatment’ of votes.”203
Hunter also cited the Anderson-Burdick test, but did not clearly apply it.204
190 See id. at 199.
191 See id. at 191.
192 See id. at 191–97.
193 See id. at 203–04.
194 Id. at 204.
195 635 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2011).
196 See HASEN, supra note 117, at 147–48.
197 See id. at 147–48; see also Hunter, 635 F.3d at 224 (directly quoting language from
the transcript of an election board meeting).
198 Hunter, 635 F.3d at 234–35, 241.
199 Id. at 235 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 106, 109 (2000) (per curiam)).
200 Id. (quoting Bush, 531 U.S. at 106).
201 Id. (quoting Edward B. Foley, Refining the Bush v. Gore Taxonomy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1035, 1037 (2007)).
202 See id. at 240–41.
203 Id. at 231, 234 (quoting Bush, 531 U.S. at 105); see also Provencher & Young, supra
note 150, at 68.
204 Provencher & Young, supra note 150, at 68; see Hunter, 635 F.3d at 238.
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The Anderson-Burdick test is rightfully under fire.205 Assessing Virginia’s ab-
sentee ballot scheme under that standard illustrates that the Anderson-Burdick test
is not strong enough to protect the fundamental right to vote.206 Courts, like the Sixth
Circuit in Hunter,207 should move toward applying the framework of Bush to state
election administration challenges. Only then will citizens be able to exercise their
fundamental right to vote irrespective of the manner in which they cast it, without
“arbitrary and disparate treatment” by the state.208
B. Applying the Standards to Virginia’s Absentee Ballot Scheme
When applying the Anderson-Burdick standard to Virginia’s mail-in absentee
ballot scheme, the first step is determining the burden.209 For voters before the 2020
updates, the first burden was meeting the excuses necessary to be approved for a
mail-in absentee ballot.210 At that time, voters needed to qualify under one of twenty
approved reasons to vote absentee by mail.211 The list of excuses was rather compre-
hensive, but some potential first-time mail-in absentee voters, like full-time care-
givers for an elderly family member, were not allowed to vote absentee by mail, even
if they fell into a pre-approved category.212 It was burdensome for voters to figure
out if they fell into one of these excused categories and fell outside of the excepted
categories for first-time voters. However, because the categories were pretty expan-
sive, it was not a significant burden.213
Next, and a current requirement, voters must request a mail-in absentee ballot.214
Voters may do that by submitting an application to their local registrar in person or
by mail, fax, or email.215 This is an added burden that in-person voters do not have
to go through, but it is not a high burden, as many voters should be able to submit
205 See Richard L. Hasen, Three Pathologies of American Voting Rights Illuminated by
the COVID-19 Pandemic, and How to Treat and Cure Them, 19ELECTION L.J.263,276(2020);
cf. Provencher & Young, supra note 150, at 65 (noting that there have been inconsistent
rulings in the lower courts over the confusion involving application of the proper test).
206 See infra Section III.B.
207 See Hunter, 635 F.3d at 234, 247.
208 See id. at 234; Bush, 531 U.S. at 105.
209 See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.
210 See VA.CODE ANN.§ 24.2-700 (West 2019); H.B. 207, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Va. 2020) (noting repeal of the excuses).
211 § 24.2-700 (West 2019).
212 Compare id. (listing, for example, caregivers), with id. § 24.2-416.1 (West 2020)
(failing to include certain absentee voters, like caregivers).
213 But see Nick Gilmore, New Study: Virginia Is One of the Hardest States to Vote in,
WVTF (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.wvtf.org/post/new-study-virginia-one-hardest-states
-vote [https://perma.cc/TGN5-JB2H] (A 2018 study ranked Virginia the 49th most difficult
state in which to vote.).
214 Absentee and Early Voting, supra note 78.
215 Id.
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the application through one of those four methods. The significant burden comes in
the form of the deadlines to request a mail-in absentee ballot. Before the recent changes,
the registrar must have received the voter’s application a week before the election.216
Now, it must be received eleven days before the election.217 Voters may apply as far
in advance as forty-five days before the election,218 but a voter may not know that
they will be unable to get to the polls on Election Day far enough out to make sure
that the registrar receives the application in time. The ability to submit the applica-
tion by email lessens the burden because it allows voters to submit their application
the last day it is due, but by the time the registrar processes the application, mails the
ballot, and the voter mails the ballot back, it very well could be too late to count.219
Before the recent changes, individuals with pre-approved excuses to vote absentee
still may not have known a week in advance that they would need to vote absentee
by mail—for example, having last-minute business outside the locality.220
Once voters have submitted their application, the largest burden comes from the
turnaround time for voters to receive their ballots with enough time to mail them
back to the registrar by the final deadline.221 The registrar has to process the applica-
tion and mail out the ballot, and then the voter has to mail the ballot back to the regis-
trar in time—before the changes, that was by close of polls on Election Day; now
it is by noon the Friday following the election.222 Before the changes, the timeline
likely looked something like the following: The application arrived the Tuesday
before the election, the office took at least a day to process the application, and then
at the earliest the registrar put ballots in the mail on Wednesday. Probably the earliest
the ballot would have gotten to the voter would have been Friday, if the voter was
in Virginia, which they may not have been as they were requesting an absentee
ballot. If the voter got home on Friday, found the ballot, and immediately dropped
it in a mailbox, it could get to the registrar’s office by close of polls Tuesday—but
216 H.B. 239, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) (noting the former deadline).
217 VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-701(B)(2) (West 2020).
218 Absentee and Early Voting, supra note 78.
219 See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.
220 See § 24.2-700 (West 2019). The state did allow for emergency absentee voting, but
that exception still had early deadlines. The first excuse for emergency absentee voting was
incapacity: the voter either became or stayed ill after the seventh day before Election Day,
or the voter is grieving the death of a close family member in that same time period. Id.
§ 24.2-705. To vote emergency absentee due to incapacity, a designated representative of the
voter must request an application to vote absentee before 2 p.m. on Election Day and return
the application by 5 p.m. on Election Day, with the actual absentee ballot returned by the time
polls close on Election Day. Id.; see also id. § 24.2-705 (West 2020). The second excuse for
emergency absentee voting is that the voter’s plans changed after noon the Saturday before
the election, but only for required emergency travel for business or hospitalization or death
of an immediate family member. Id. § 24.2-705.1 (West 2019). In that case, the voter must
apply for an absentee ballot and vote in-person by 2 p.m. the day before the election. Id.
221 See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
222 See H.B. 238, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020).
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that would have been an extremely tight turnaround time. Given that timeline, moving
the deadline to request an absentee ballot up to eleven days before the election gave
the state more time, but it also gave voters less time to request an absentee ballot if
they need one.223
Importantly, if something is wrong with the ballot, like it is for the incorrect
election, has the wrong name on it, or was sent to the wrong address, there is no real
safeguard to address those state errors.224 The registrar could send a new ballot, but
it likely would not arrive in time. The new ballot would not fall into the narrow
exceptions to accept late ballots because it was not requested within three business
days of the original application’s receipt.225 This tight turnaround, which allows no
realistic safeguard to deal with state errors, is a significant burden on voters.
Under the Crawford plurality’s Anderson-Burdick analysis, a court may agree
that this scheme is a significant burden but nevertheless disregard that burden because
only about 7,000 absentee ballots arrived late in the last election for which information
is available226—a far fewer number than the 43,000 affected voters that the Court did
not find to be a large enough group in Crawford.227 If a court instead focuses on the
337,315 people who voted absentee in 2018 (nearly 10% of all votes),228 it may be
persuaded that this heavy burden affects a significant enough number of voters.
After evaluating the burdens of the law, the next step is to evaluate the state
interest.229 If there is a high burden, like with Virginia’s absentee voter scheme, the
state interest must be compelling and the law narrowly tailored to that interest.230 The
state’s interests might include, inter alia, preventing fraud, securing timely election
results, and keeping administrative costs low.231 The state might also be interested
in assuring voter confidence in election integrity.232 While the Court in Crawford
found preventing voter fraud to be a compelling-enough interest to justify Indiana’s
voter ID requirements,233 the mail-in absentee ballot law is very different and not
narrowly tailored to further the state’s compelling interests.
The mail-in absentee ballot law is extremely underinclusive because it results
in thousands of absentee ballots being discarded.234 It excludes voters who meet the
223 See H.B. 239, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020).
224 See § 24.2-612 (West 2020).
225 See id. §§ 24.2-612, 709.
226 VA. DEP’T ELECTIONS, supra note 96, at 7.
227 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 186, 189, 200 (2008)
(plurality opinion).
228 Registration/Turnout Reports, supra note 15.
229 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
230 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190.
231 See, e.g., id. at 225 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“There is no denying the abstract importance,
the compelling nature, of combating voter fraud.” (citation omitted)).
232 See id. at 235 (noting states’ “legitimate interest in safeguarding public confidence”).
233 Id. at 191 (plurality opinion).
234 See VA. DEP’T ELECTIONS, supra note 96, at 7.
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first deadline to apply for an absentee ballot but are not allowed enough time to
return, and even sometimes receive, that ballot.235 In its previous form with the
excuse requirements, it also unnecessarily prevented voters from even being able to
apply for mail-in absentee votes. The law is overinclusive because it allows dead
residents to vote absentee by mail236 but does not actually address concerns that the
state may have about voter fraud—which happens extremely rarely in-person, but
absentee ballots are susceptible to it.237
The state might counter that while voter fraud is rare,238 a political operative was
recently indicted on charges of tampering with absentee ballots in North Carolina,
which caused the state to redo the election.239 Additionally, the state might argue that
continued, but debunked claims of voter fraud from the president,240 combined with
careless claims of absentee voter fraud from the candidate who lost the 2019 Kentucky
gubernatorial race,241 necessitate strict rules to dissuade concerns of absentee voter
fraud. However, measures to counter voter fraud are already in place—the state just
needs to verify the voter’s information when the absentee ballot arrives.242 If courts
235 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-612, 24.2-709 (West 2020).
236 See id. § 24.2-709.
237 Most reports of voter fraud at the polls are actually the result of clerical error or bad
data matching—rates of voter fraud are between 0.0003% and 0.0025%. Debunking the
Voter Fraud Myth, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org
/our-work/research-reports/debunking-voter-fraud-myth [https://perma.cc/4N4T-GWDJ]. It
is more likely “that an American ‘will be struck by lightning than that he will impersonate
another voter at the polls.’” Id. (quoting Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud,BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. 4 (Nov. 2007), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08
/Report_Truth-About-Voter-Fraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F7L-69U8]). However, in the 2019
race for North Carolina’s Ninth Congressional District, a Republican operative was indicted
on felony charges for tampering with absentee ballots. Richard Gonzales, North Carolina
GOP Operative Faces Felony Charges that Allege Ballot Fraud, NPR (July 30, 2019, 10:29
PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/30/746800630/north-carolina-gop-operative -faces-new
-felony-charges-that-allege-ballot-fraud [https://perma.cc/WBU8-FZVJ].
238 Debunking the Voter Fraud Myth, supra note 237.
239 Gonzales, supra note 237.
240 Amy Gardner, Trump’s Revival of Claim of Voting Fraud in New Hampshire Alarms
Some State Republicans, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/trumps-revival-of-claim-of-voting-fraud-in-new-hampshire-alarms-some
-state-republicans/2019/08/28/0c22107e-c38f-11e9-9986-1fb3e4397be4_story.html
[https://perma.cc/37LA-K42P]; In Their Own Words: Officials Refuting False Claims of Voter
Fraud, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work
/research-reports/their-own-words-officials-refuting-false-claims-voter-fraud [https://perma
.cc/D7SB-7B93].
241 Miles Parks, Skeptics Urge Bevin to Show Proof of Fraud Claims, Warning of Corro-
sive Effects, NPR (Nov. 10, 2019, 7:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/10/777300611
/skeptics-urge-bevin-to-show-proof-of-fraud-claims-warning-of-corrosive-effects [https://
perma.cc/N3RB-QMUP].
242 See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-710 (West 2020).
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continue to follow the Anderson-Burdick analysis, this would, unfortunately, likely
satisfy the compelling interest and narrow tailoring requirements.243 At that point,
a court may not even continue to analyze other state interests, and the absentee
ballot scheme would likely be upheld. What good is a fundamental right if a state
can take it away with restrictive deadlines or a misprinted name?
Alternatively, a court could come to a more just conclusion under Bush’s
arbitrary and disparate impact test.244 In this absentee ballot scheme, the state, having
granted the right to vote on equal terms, arbitrarily and disparately values in-person
votes (on Election Day or absentee) over mail-in absentee votes. Given that treat-
ment, a court would likely find the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause.245
Fortunately, Virginia has already started to change the absentee voting laws.246
However, there is still room for improvement. The state should allow for more time
to count valid, late absentee ballots provisionally if they arrive within ten days.247
This would allow for more flexibility in dealing with state error. The state already
counts some ballots provisionally248 but does not certify results until the third Monday
of the month.249 Arbitrarily and disparately discarding votes due to unworkable dead-
lines or state error is not the way to ensure voter confidence and election integrity.
IV. HOW TO PREVENT AND TREAT STATE ERROR IN ABSENTEE BALLOTS
There are a few solutions to prevent future violations of the fundamental right
to vote. States should expand the window to request and return absentee ballots, as
well as implement safeguards to count certain absentee ballots provisionally.250
Additionally, Congress should intervene and mandate certain safeguards for all states,
similar to HAVA.251 The best solution is proactive: rather than find a way to deal
with tens, hundreds, or thousands of absentee ballots that would have been counted
but for state error or unworkable deadlines, states should try to anticipate and pre-
vent such issues with a two-pronged approach.
243 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203–04 (2008) (plurality
opinion).
244 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (per curiam).
245 See Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 231, 234 (6th Cir. 2011).
246 See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
247 Three states—Alaska, Maryland, and Ohio—currently accept late absentee ballots that
arrive within ten days following Election Day. See Absentee Ballot Deadlines, supra note 61.
248 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-653, 653.01 (West 2020).
249 Id. § 24.2-679(A).
250 For example, a new Pennsylvania law allows voters to cast absentee ballots up to fifty
days before an election. Simko-Bednarski, supra note 49. The deadline to return absentee
ballots in Pennsylvania is 8 p.m. on Election Day, making Pennsylvania’s absentee ballot
window the longest in the country. Id.
251 See Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, §§ 302–03, 116 Stat. 1666,
1706–14; cf. KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 118, at 26.
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First, states should implement a preventive approach. One change should be
expanding the deadlines to apply for and return absentee ballots, which would likely
address a large amount of the otherwise valid late absentee ballots.252 Like Pennsyl-
vania, states should move toward allowing voters to request absentee ballots 50 days
before an election to ensure ample time to process applications.253 Of course, that
alone will not solve the problem of people needing last-minute absentee ballots.
To alleviate the burden on voters requesting last-minute absentee ballots, and all
other absentee ballots, states should count all absentee ballots postmarked by Election
Day that arrive within a reasonable time frame.254 This would allow states to count
absentee ballots that would have otherwise been invalid because of a missed deadline.
It also allows the voter and the state to work together to fix situations where absentee
ballots are mailed to the wrong person, or the wrong ballot is mailed, or countless
other issues, with enough time for the voter to submit a timely absentee ballot.
States should count those ballots postmarked by Election Day that arrive within
ten days after Election Day.255 In Virginia, the state does not certify results until
thirteen days after the election,256 leaving time to account for slow delivery of valid
ballots. This is a reasonable timeline for states to count absentee ballots while still
ensuring timely election results.
States should also implement a uniform system so all voters can track their
absentee ballots and know if they have been counted—otherwise, voters will not
know that there is a problem with their ballot to fix the error. Some states have these
tracking systems already, but others do not.257 A clear, uniform tracking system has
252 In Virginia alone, almost 7,000 otherwise valid absentee ballots arrived late in the last
election. See VA. DEP’T ELECTIONS, supra note 96, at 7.
253 See Simko-Bednarski, supra note 49.
254 Many states already employ this practice. Absentee Ballot Deadlines, supra note 61.
One example of how this deadline can still be prohibitively restrictive is California’s
absentee ballot scheme, which was temporarily altered in 2020 to accommodate anticipated
pandemic-related mail sorting issues. See John Myers, What You Should Know About How
and When California Counts Ballots, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2020, 2:26 PM), https://www.la
times.com/california/story/2020-11-02/2020-election-california-ballot-count [https://perma
.cc/BA4C-VQQ6]. Normally, absentee ballots must be postmarked by Election Day and
received within three days of the election. Id. If someone is mailing a ballot from Sacramento
to San Diego, it seems unlikely that, even within the state, a piece of mail would be processed
and delivered from cities eight hours away from each other in three days.
255 Alaska, Maryland, and Ohio already follow this recommendation. See id.
256 See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-679 (West 2019).
257 See Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and Other Voting at Home
Options, supra note 30 (noting that at least forty-four states and the District of Columbia
either mandate or voluntarily maintain some form of ballot tracking for absentee/mailed
ballots). California’s ballot tracking systems differ by county, and some counties do not have
online ballot tracking, where voters must call the county election office. Ballot Status, CAL.
SEC’YSTATE, https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-status/ [https://perma.cc/AGD8-D6FZ]
(last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
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the potential to further political participation and keep citizens informed of what is
happening with their ballots. Part of this uniform tracking should include a way to
alert a voter if their absentee ballot will not be counted due to error.
Second, states should treat absentee ballots that would not be counted because
of state error like misprinting or misdelivery as provisional ballots. This would treat
absentee voters the same as in-person voters in regards to how long they have to
make their decision (until Election Day), while accounting for how long it may take
the mail to arrive, especially in large states or when a voter is mailing their ballot
from a different state. Hopefully the preventive approach proposed above will fix
most state error with absentee ballots, but the reality is that mix-ups will inevitably
happen. In those situations, it is not sufficient for states to refuse to count valid
absentee ballots because of state error. Treating those ballots like provisional ballots
will ensure more safeguards for the fundamental right to vote.258
What does it mean for a ballot to be counted provisionally? In Virginia, provi-
sional ballots are kept apart from the in-person Election Day ballots, and they are
not counted on Election Day.259 They are used when voters believe they are regis-
tered at that precinct but for some reason are not on the registered voters list, when
voters do not have the correct form of identification on them, and when voters who
were sent an absentee ballot have not received or have lost the ballot.260 The election
board looks at the provisional ballots the next day, and determines whether the
voters are qualified and thus whether the votes will be counted.261
While Pennsylvania is a good example of a mixed-party government working
together to pass election reform,262 states may not want to follow its lead. If states
are unwilling to enact election reforms, Congress should use its Elections Clause
power to enact preventive measures to prevent disenfranchisement of absentee voters,
and to require states to count absentee ballots provisionally that would have been
counted but for state error.263 Congress could do this by amending HAVA or passing
a separate bill. This uniformity would eliminate concerns about arbitrary and disparate
treatment.264 Although it could only be binding on federal elections, the administra-
tive burden of following different procedures for different elections should lead to
enactment of those changes in all elections.
258 For more on this perspective, see Provisional Ballots in Virginia: What Are They, and
When Are They Used?, WUSA9, https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/politics/elections/pro
visional-ballots-in-virginia-what-are-they-and-when-are-they-used/65-611852666 [https://
perma.cc/RJE2-WWTK] (Nov. 6, 2018, 6:52 PM).
259 Id.; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-651.1, 653, 653.1 (West 2020).
260 Provisional Ballots in Virginia: What Are They, and When Are They Used?, supra note
258.
261 Id.
262 See Simko-Bednarski, supra note 49.
263 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“[T]he Congress may at any time by Law make or alter [time,
place and manner election] Regulations . . . .”).
264 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (per curiam).
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Aside from the legislative action suggested above, voters whose timely absentee
ballots were not counted because the state could not receive their ballots in time
could bring a lawsuit and seek a judicial declaration that the state’s absentee ballot
deadlines are facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied.265 However,
even if the theoretical plaintiffs were successful in proving a constitutional violation,
the law would merely be invalidated.266 Legislative reform at the state level would
still be necessary. States should amend and clarify their absentee ballot schemes to
provide measures to prevent the state from treating voters who submit mail-in ab-
sentee ballots arbitrarily and disparately compared to in-person voters.267 If the
federal government shifts to being in a position to pass such reform, Congress should
also overhaul absentee ballot schemes at the federal level.268
CONCLUSION
As more people vote absentee, more voters will be disenfranchised by state error
or unconstitutionally restrictive mailing deadlines.269 These methods of disenfran-
chisement, while passive, are still a serious constitutional violation of citizens’ funda-
mental right to vote. States must act promptly to fix these holes in their absentee
ballot schemes.
As states address these constitutional violations, courts should continue moving
toward applying Bush’s arbitrary and disparate treatment test in evaluating the con-
stitutionality of state election administration laws.270 States should enact preventive
measures to make sure that absentee voters are not treated in an arbitrary and disparate
manner compared to in-person voters.271 Additionally, states should provide a safe-
guard to count absentee ballots that would have been counted but for state error as
provisional ballots. If states do not take action, Congress should mandate preventive
measures to ensure consistency of absentee voting and enact provisional ballot safe-
guards. States cannot bestow the right to vote absentee on citizens and then draw
lines that are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause.
265 See, e.g., Petition for Review, supra note 47, ¶¶ 103–06.
266 See id.
267 See Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 231, 234 (6th Cir. 2011).
268 The Help America Vote Act’s provisional voting framework should serve as the
foundation for federal legislation to regulate absentee ballot schemes at the federal level. See
Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, §§ 302–03, 116 Stat. 1666, 1706–14;
see also KROPF & KIMBALL, supra note 118, at 26.
269 See supra Part III.
270 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (per curiam).
271 See Hunter, 635 F.3d at 231, 234.
